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September 07, 2006
French perspectives
I am in the midst of a long, slow process of trying to understand the French, their country, their culture and their way of looking at the world. The world has a lot of countries and I would not focus on a middle-sized one with an almost stagnant economy and population, but my son married a French woman and has lived there for over a decade. My grandchildren speak French.
Like most Americans my original view of France was that it was our oldest ally and oldest friend. Lafayette helped George Washington win our independence. The French sent us the Statue of Liberty. We saved them in two world wars for which they surely must be grateful.
Nationalism
The first hint that my view was flawed came decades ago when I read Charles DeGaulle's autobiography. My dad fought the Nazis in World War 2 and he told me he fought against extreme nationalism. He told me the US was founded on principles, while Nazi Germany was a nation that didn't care about right or wrong, just its own selfish national interest. To my surprise DeGaulle's autobiography showed he was very much a nationalist. France was the center and primary source of meaning in his life. Whatever was good for France was, by definition, right.
European nationalism is hard for an American to understand. It encompasses things in one package - identity, values, ultimate beliefs, life purposes - which for Americans are more distributed or diffuse. I believe in God who is sovereign over all nations and if it ever came down to a choice, loyalty to God is more important than loyalty to country. My ancestors were all immigrants; they chose to come to America motivated by a desire for religious freedom, political freedom, and economic freedom and opportunity. If the US loses those things and another country offers them, I'll emigrate. I'm an American but it's a qualified commitment.
It does not appear the French think that way. Very few are as nationalistic as DeGaulle, but still they genuinely feel France is the best country, with the best culture, the best way of life, the most glorious history, the greatest intellectual achievements, etc. You must speak French to be truly civilized and to participate in a truly great culture. Nobody brags about this, no one is obnoxious about it, but it's there below the surface.
The US has its nationalists. Senator McCain of Arizona comes to mind. Many rural and working class people are nationalistic. Generally, however, the more educated, mature and well-traveled Americans become, the less nationalistic and culturally chauvinistic they are. In France it seems even the most educated people regard their culture as superior and unique.
French Memory of the World Wars
This perception of French superiority is assisted by a selective memory. The French are proud that they won the two world wars. Of course they had allies but countries at war almost always do. A few years ago my daughter-in-law (who is bi-lingual, tri-lingual actually and well-educated) and I were talking about Nancy, a city in northern France, east of Paris. I mentioned my grandfather was there for a year or so in 1917-1918. "Oh, so he spoke French!"
He did not because he was among over a million American soldiers fighting the Germans. Just as most Americans, she is not a history buff. But American assistance in WW 1 was not emphasized in her schooling. The fact that in 1917 France was exhausted, that the war was at best a stalemate and in fact Germany probably had the upper hand, and that America's intervention changed everything in favor of the allies, is generally unrecognized.
Before we get judgmental, recall there were French troops fighting alongside Americans at Yorktown, the decisive battle where the US won its independence from Great Britain. Most high school graduates don't know about the Battle of Yorktown, much less the French troops. And as far as allies are concerned, in WW 2 Russia bore the brunt of the fight against the Wehrmacht. You don't read a lot about that in US history books.
WW 2 is a tougher for the French to deal with than the first world war. So far I've been exposed to two ways in which the French adjust their memory of WW 2. The D Day landings in Normandy in June, 1944 did not include French troops. This was the most important battle for the liberation of France, and the French were spectators. So now the French celebrate two naval landings in France. They don't claim they're of equal importance but they imply it.
The second landing was Operation Dragoon, August 15, 1944, on the beaches of southeastern France. Three American divisions and a reinforced French armor division landed. In the north allied forces had already broken out of the Normandy beachhead, the Germans were in retreat, and German forces in the south were streaming north. Operation Dragoon had almost no casualties. The British considered the whole operation a waste of resources.
I encountered the second memory adjustment for WW 2 this past August. It was just a local matter. I gave up trying to learn the French language while living in middle America and signed up for 4 weeks of language classes in Chambery, France. Chambery is a small city in the Alps a couple hours' train ride south of Geneva, Switzerland. It was the capital of Savoy when Savoy was part of an independent country (up until the mid-nineteenth century). It's a charming, scenic place with winding streets and 400 year old buildings, in a beautiful natural setting.
In WW 2 Chambery was not of great strategic value. I am not aware of German troops being stationed there, or of any battles in the vicinity. German troops fleeing Operation Dragoon did pass through, and the US Air Force tried to bomb the train station. They missed and hit civilian areas. In Chambery that is the memory of WW 2. Americans bombed the city. They're aware of the bigger picture, but the bombing was the only thing mentioned about WW 2 by the guide in an extended tour of the city I took at the start of my month, and the only thing (about WW 2) mentioned in conversation with a Frenchman who talked with me at some length. The memory is of those reckless, bloodthirsty Americans, attacking and bombing innocent people.
Talking with a Frenchman
My conversation with the Frenchman was a great learning experience. He was my "proprietor". In Chambery I rented a small studio apartment for the month of August. It was in a large, 5 story apartment building, and evidently the studio was routinely rented to students at the language school. I don't know how many apartments my proprietor owned, but he was one of many owners of the building on something similar to a condominium basis. He was an extrovert, liked people, was 4 years older than me, and retired with free time.
Reading between the lines I think he had several reasons for befriending me, in addition to his outgoing personality. One was to encourage me in my studies, another was to persuade me of the inherent superiority of the French way of life, and perhaps a third was to correct misperceptions Americans have of the French, such as being unfriendly or rude, or (given the legislation prescribing a 35 hour workweek) the notion they are lazy.
We spoke mostly in French which limited conversation to general points. He didn't speak English but he knew more English than I knew French. We kept a dictionary handy but still follow-up questions and digging to underlying points were almost impossible.
First to his points. The encouragement to study reminded me strongly of the American Christian idea of "witnessing." I'm not talking about threatening people with hell fire, but the soft sell of opening people's eyes to religious issues, giving them a Christian perspective on things (without being obnoxious), and inviting them to church or some other fellowship. The French are "evangelical" about their culture. They believe they have the greatest culture in the world and they want to bless us by inviting us to participate. They realize a hard sell would be ineffective, but encouragement and positive reinforcement may work.
- quality of life
I am nowhere near being able to read great literature, philosophy or poetry, so the examples of French excellence had to do with lifestyle, food and wine, the beauty of the countryside and so on. He invited me to his home. He had a spacious condo on the top floor of an upscale building with a superb view of the city and the mountains. His home was filled with nice things. He explained that although Chambery was not a large city there were cultural events virtually every weekend. He could enjoy classical music, dance, theater, a variety of cinema and other offerings. Here's a middle class guy who really does have a great life.
My son, being in the computer industry, could work in the US as readily as France. He chooses France. Part of the reason is my daughter-in-law's large but very close family. The other reason is lifestyle. He could work in Silicon Valley, living in superexpensive but inadequate housing, with an extremely long commute, unattractive surroundings, smog etc. In France he doesn't have to drive to get to nice places and beautiful scenery. Co-workers and neighbors are friendly and cultured. The food is better. The produce is fresher and more diverse. The cheese if fabulous. The wine has distinctive flavor and decent wine is not so expensive as in the US. Medical care is affordable. Public transportation works. Crime is low and you generally feel safe on the streets after dark. Living in France is good.
I'm aware that life in France has its problems. Per capita income is about 70% of the US. This shows up in various ways. Houses are smaller. My son's family of 5 lives in a 1700 sq. ft. house and it is considered spacious. Most successful middle class families live in 1200 ft. sq. or less. There are plenty of poor people and unemployment is massive. Compared to the US, paychecks are smaller, taxes are higher, and the cost of living is about the same.
Middle class people in France are not expected to have capital. In the US a couple, say two schoolteachers, who are prudent and take advantage of savings vehicles like IRAs, pension programs and the like, will probably retire with several hundred thousand dollars or more in savings. In France the same couple is lucky if they can help their son or daughter make a down payment on a house. The government handles pensions. Everybody is taken care of.
Retired people today experienced the Thirty Glorious Years, centered on the 60s and 70s, when the French economy was growing nicely, unemployment was low, and incomes were comparable to or better than the US. Homes were bought and paid for and savings were funded. So although people of my proprietor's age generally have a prosperous lifestyle, for young people today life is harder. It's tougher to make ends meet, and the future is uncertain. France's pension system is in at least as much trouble as the US social security system. People without high level job skills have limited opportunities and low income potential. Masses of unemployed are simply being left behind.
- French courtesy and industriousness
Back to my proprietor's points; the French are very courteous and considerate people. That has been my experience with the vast majority of interactions with French people. There have been exceptions, almost all in Paris. I think that's because Paris is a very big city. (You may not believe this but I have actually been treated rudely in New York City.) Also Paris is overrun with tourists who have the ability to annoy people. In addition the French who were rude to me were almost all petty officials - bus drivers, ticket window clerks, etc. - and I don't think it was Frenchness that caused the problem. I think they work at the bottom of a very high organizational hill, down which unpleasant things often flow.
As far as French laziness and the 35 hour week, I don't know the whole story. In my son's extended family the people who work for private industry in a professional or managerial capacity work awfully hard. One or two who have government jobs do not. I don't know any union members but I suspect if you belong to a powerful union you are in a position similar to a government worker. If you are not a government worker and not in a strong union, then you and your employer face a terrible reality. The government has in place a massive program to prevent hiring and to insure high unemployment. It is a combination of high taxes on employment, laws forbidding firing or layoffs, and various required inefficiencies in work practices. The result is employers have to get the absolute maximum out of their few employees. They work them very hard.
- Lebanon
We were talking about travel and places around the world, and my proprietor mentioned Lebanon. He said it's a wonderful country because the people speak French, the food is excellent and the climate and geography are lovely. Israel's incursion in south Lebanon was going on at the time. My proprietor said it was terrible. The Jews (he did not call them Israelis) attacked for no reason. The Lebanese never did anything to them and never even criticized the Jews. Now the Jews had killed civilians, destroyed homes and businesses, and shattered the economy. I asked about Hezbollah but could not follow the brief answer. My impression was it was dismissive.
My proprietor seemed to have heard only one side of the news - all the bad things Israel had done. I don't know if he was selective in what he paid attention to, or if the French media was selective in its reporting.
- the Cold War
As we continued to discuss geopolitics I got a big surprise. My proprietor told me Stalin never intended to invade western Europe. Because of the language barrier I couldn't explore the implications. But think of it. The Cold War was a gigantic farce. There was no threat. It was just a plot by Britain and the US to put troops in the heart of Europe and to dominate western Europe. Anything the French did to pursue an independent path or which had the effect of undermining NATO was entirely justified.
So you can see French historical memory taking shape. The Soviet Union wasn't a threat; the imperial ambitions of the "Anglo-Saxons" were the real problem.
I believe there are problems with my proprietor's perspective. Risking your nation's survival on the good intentions of a totalitarian dictator who has enslaved numerous nations and murdered tens of millions of his own citizens is not prudent. Knowing the intentions of a dictator in one of the world's most secretive states is uncertain, particularly with the Soviet skill in "disinformation." Also, intentions change over time. The intentions of power-hungry dictators are particularly prone to change when they see weakness. But can I prove the risk was real and serious? The Cold War is over, nothing too terrible happened, and my proprietor is undoubtedly secure in his views.
- The French language
Another conversation related to the number of French-speakers in the world. My proprietor said there were 200,000,000. My search of the internet indicates around 130 million. The number who speak French as a first language, the language spoken daily in the home, is reasonably clear to estimate. It would be the population of France (60 million), of Quebec (10 million) and portions of Belgium and Switzerland; roughly 75 million. The tougher estimate is for how many people is it the primary second language? My proprietor was counting a lot more people in north Africa and west Africa than non-French experts do. In any event the widespread use of French was a point of pride.
In this context my proprietor said Vietnam was "lost." There are a number of ways Vietnam might be considered lost - it is no longer a French possession, the French army was defeated there, a French ally was defeated there, and the Vietnamese people are suffering great economic and political hardship under a totalitarian government. But none of these losses were important. They no longer speak French, that was the important point.
Even though in the early 20th Century you could plot the French Empire on a map, it was actually a cultural empire, an empire of the mind and heart, an empire in which people in darkness became civilized and joined the world's one truly great culture. So while the British, with their vast commonwealth built on administration, law, commerce, and military ties, have lost their empire, the French empire has not disappeared so long as the cultural tie remains. The British have adjusted to historical change but at some emotional level the French have not. [Even lay people such as myself are entitled to make grandiose generalizations now and then.]
France leads the Agence de la Francophonie, a voluntary organization of 53 states. Most of us are familiar with the British Commonwealth, an organization of states which were ruled by Britain until the end of colonialism in the 20th Century. They are united by shared recent history and concern themselves with political and economic issues.
The Agence de la Francophonie is similar, but the uniting principle is use of or interest in the French language, and cultural cooperation leads its list of objectives. It includes countries that have not been politically tied to France for a very long time (Haiti and several Caribbean island nations), provinces of Canada (Quebec and New Brunswick) that have not been French for 2 1/2 centuries, and countries that were never French, such as Romania and Moldova which speak a Romance language but are islands in a slavic sea. Promoting democracy and human rights are not included in the stated aims. This is first and foremost a linguistic and cultural association.
- miscellaneous
I remember a couple of other topics we discussed. My proprietor was very proud of the European Union. After all the wars and national rivalries, constructing the EU was the great political achievement of his lifetime. There was an English retiree at the language school who also regarded the EU as an achievement of the utmost importance. The younger, university-age people at the language school regarded the EU as just part of the landscape, something that came into existence before they came of age.
In the context of the EU I asked about potential friction with Russia over the large Russian population in Latvia and other Baltic nations. I made the analogy to Germans in the Sudetenland in 1938. The issue had never occurred to him and he dismissed it out of hand, noting current Russian economic weakness. Even though the EU was a great achievement, it does not entail any need to consider the long term security issues of other EU members. The attitude was particularly surprising in that the French government (unofficially) wants to dissolve NATO or at least chase it out of Europe.
I asked about the French rejection of the EU constititution in last year's referendum. My proprietor voted for it but said the majority was afraid of liberalism. In Europe liberal means free markets and economic liberty. I'm not sure how we ended up with the opposite meaning in the US. In France the government has its hands in everything, there are pervasive subsidies and social services, and the economic system is called "dirigiste" because the government directs major decisions. The French like that and are frightened of any change.
The last thing to mention about my proprietor is that he described France as a "small country" and himself as a "19th Century man." Obviously France is not a small country. It has 60 million people. In a world where China has 1.3 billion and India over a billion, it's not large but neither is it small. I took his statement to mean France has far less influence in the world than he would like. As far as the 19th Century, I took that as another way of saying what I wrote above; he may see objectively that France is no longer one of the leading nations with its language spoken and its culture admired around the world, but emotionally, he has not let go.
History
Books on French history would fill a library. I have been reading about French history, in English, since my son moved there so I have a general overview. Three topics in particular are of interest. Does history provide a partial explanation for the French feeling of superiority? Why do the French hate the English (and English-speakers)? And, how do the French conduct foreign policy?
1. French superiority
I've mentioned that the quality of life in France is excellent if you are at least moderately prosperous. That is true in most western European countries. Each country is prosperous and can boast of its great writers, philosophers, musicians, artists, scientists etc. Why should the French think they're special? One possible reason is that since the fall of the Roman Empire over 15 centuries ago France has been, off and on but persistently, the leading country of Europe.
I have to qualify what I say; "country" is an elusive concept if you go back more than five centuries or so. Feudalism was the organizing principle and loyalties were to a ruler or ruling family more than to a geographic and linguistic entity. Also, when I say Europe I am generally referring to those areas of Europe that once were or continue to be Roman Catholic. We're dealing in generalities here.
- the first 1000 years after Rome
The fall of the (western) Roman Empire was a process that lasted decades. For some time many German tribes - Goths, Alemanni, Franks, Burgundians, and many others - pressed on the borders of the empire. Militarily they were stronger than the Romans. In the first half of the 5th Century they swarmed into the empire, throughout western Europe and even into North Africa. What was not immediately obvious was that the German tribes were being pushed by an even stronger military power, the Huns moving west out of central Asia.
By 450 A.D. the Huns had conquered all of eastern Europe and what is now Germany. In 451 they invaded (what is now) France. The Roman army was no where to be seen. The Huns were opposed by a collection of Gallo-Romans, Visigoths, Burgundians and Franks, i.e. the ancestors of the French today. The leader of the Franks was a guy named Marevech [spellings vary]. It's not clear if the battle was a victory for the "French" but the Hun advance was checked and they withdrew, not to return.
Two genertions later Marevich's grandson Clovis led the Franks and in the early 6th Century established a large kingdom including most of what is now France and Germany. It was rivaled in size by the Visigoth Kingdom in the Iberian peninsula and southern France, and the Ostrogoth Kingdom over what are now Italy, Austria, and part of the Balkans.
Clovis managed to distinguish himself from the other barbarian kings. He converted to Catholicism. The others followed a heretical form of Christianity called Arianism which made them very unpopular. By his conversion Clovis became the admired champion of all former subjects of Rome. The Franks were the leaders of Europe, at least in terms of prestige and public goodwill.
Clovis established a dynasty, called Merovingian in honor of Marevich, and his Frankish Kingdom, with various dynastic and territorial changes, managed to stumble through history and become modern France. The Ostrogoths and Visigoths are long gone. My understanding is that the name Clovis is linguistically related to Louis, which is why so many French kings were named Louis.
The dynasty continued for about two and a half centuries, with succeeding generations of kings becoming more dissolute, incompetent and ineffective. But the Frankish nobility retained its skill at war and the kingdom grew in importance. Italy soon dissolved into competing subunits. Mounted barbarian tribes continued to arrive from central Asia, subjugating eastern and central Europe. The Visigoths hung on until a new and terrible threat arose: Islam. In the early 8th Century Muslims overran the Iberian peninsula, except for a sliver in the north.
In the Frankish kingdom a noble family gained de facto control acting in the name of the Merovingian kings. When the Muslim army invaded southern France in 732 one of these nobles, Charles Martel, defeated them. Around 750 Martel's son, Pepin II, performed some military services for the Pope and, with the blessing of the church, disposed of the old dynasty and establish his own.
Pepin's son took the dynasty to great glory. He was arguably France's greatest leader, Charlemagne. Charlemagne was a conqueror and he extended the Frankish kingdom nearly to the present borders of Poland and Romania, encompassing all or part of about a dozen modern European nations.
I say arguably the greatest for two reasons. First Napoleon Bonaparte conquered more square miles, but Napoleon's reign was brief and most of the territories were seething with rebellion. Second, was Charlemagne French? He spent most of his time in what is now Germany, fighting on the eastern front. His capital (Aachen) was in Germany. He was chief of a German tribe. But that tribe was the Franks, and France claims him.
After his death Charlemagne's empire broke up. The biggest pieces were the Kingdom of France and the German Empire. The German Empire, sometimes called the Holy Roman Empire, was geographically larger but it had no political cohesion. Initially the French kings had little control over the whole country, but around 1000 A.D. a new dynasty, the Capetans, began to slowly build central authority. Almost by default, during the whole period France would be considered the most important nation in Europe.
The biggest distraction from French prestige was the English. France, in the person of William of Normandy, conquered England in 1066 and this was the beginning of a lot of problems. With the conquest Frenchmen became the nobility of England, and the kings and higher nobility continued to be closely tied to France through extensive intermarriage with the nobility in France. You might think this would lead to one big happy family. Instead it led to continuing territorial disputes as the English inherited lands in France. At one point an English king had as good or better genealogical claim to the throne of France as any French nobleman. It took centuries of war to sort these things out.
For ten or eleven centuries France was the foremost nation of Europe. The King enjoyed great prestige at the top of a feudal pyramid, and as a close friend of the Pope. But the king's power was not real. French nobility owned vast tracts of land and governed whole provinces. They ignored the king at will. Most royal energies were devoted to survival in a hostile environment and the gradual accretion of power so as to become a ruler in fact as well as in feudal theory. It wasn't until the 16th Century that French kings were able to project power beyond their borders with any consistency or hope of effectiveness.
Nevertheless France was very influential in Europe. The University of Paris was perhaps the greatest learning center of all medieval Europe, drawing scholars from many countries. It was there that the great theological issues of the day were debated. France was an innovator in architecture, for example introducing the Gothic style for cathedrals. (If you've traveled in Europe you know the significance of cathedrals.) They were leaders in vernacular literature and poetry. The style of French courts was widely admired and copied. Very early on France began to build its cultural influence, the empire of the heart and mind.
- the last five centuries
In the 16th Century French preeminence was eclipsed by two developments, Spain's conquest of the new world and the rise of the Hapsburgs. Spain's vast empire gave it great wealth and a strong military. The Hapsburgs were a noble family that managed to assemble a European empire through marriage. We know them best as the dynasty that ruled the Austro-Hungarian Empire until the end of WW 1. They ruled in one place or another for eight centuries over lands from one end of Europe to the other.
Spain alone could be considered the leading nation of Europe in the 16th Century, but in 1506 a Hapsburg prince married the daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella (who had financed Columbus' voyages) thus uniting two great European powers. France fell to a second rank power.
Difficult times for France brought forth the greatest statesman and diplomat of the nation's history, and certainly the greatest French leader ever without a military background, Cardinal Richelieu. Richelieu was Louis XIII's foreign minister in 1616 and prime minister from 1624 until his death in 1642. You may recognize the name; he was the arch villain in Dumas' novel The Three Musketeers. Whether he was a villain in real life depends on your point of view, but he did great things for France.
Richelieu completed the centuries long effort to consolidate power within France under the king. Interestingly he used culture as one of his weapons, as a way to draw people's loyalty away from the regions and to the nation. However his great achievement was in foreign policy. He broke the power of Spain and the Hapsburgs, and made France more than ever the preeminent power in Europe, a position not to be reversed until the rise of a united Germany toward the end of the 19th Century.
How did he do it? He entangled his enemies in debilitating, expensive wars until their power was greatly weakened. France did not participate in those wars, but France fostered them with secret diplomacy and subsidies. Richelieu engaged his enemies by proxy, often without them realizing what he was doing. Richelieu was intellectually brilliant, a respected theologian, a friend of the Pope, and a Cardinal in the Catholic Church. The Reformation was going on in northern Europe, and the Hapsburgs regarded themselves as the champions of orthodoxy against the Protestant heresy.
Richelieu led the Hapsburgs to believe he supported them, while secretly negotiating with and subsidizing Protestants. He subsidized the Lutheran king of Sweden, Gustavus Adolphus II, who waged war against the Hapsburgs. A generation of Swedish men faced war and death in furtherance of French foreign policy. Thus Richelieu fanned the flames of the Thirty Years War (1618 - 1648) which caused countless deaths, devastation and depopulation in Germany, and a great diminution of Hapsburg power. Richelieu pursued his policy with consummate skill and duplicity.
For two centuries after Richelieu European political history essentially consisted of other nations scrambling to form alliances in response to French initiatives. King Louis XIV pushed to extend his eastern border to the Rhine River, a natural and defensible geographic boundary. This precipitated decades of war and he was finally checked by Dutch stubborness and two brilliant generals, the Austrian Prince Eugene and the English Duke of Marlborough. In the next century, Napoleon was a genius with a monumental will to power. He plunged all Europe into war and had to be beaten twice before he stopped causing trouble, first by the Russians and a second time by the Duke of Wellington with Prussian allies.
The roughly three centuries from about 1600 to 1900 were the time of France's greatest glory. French borders expanded eastward to their present limits, to take in Lille and its environs near Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine, Franche Comte, Savoy and Nice. Napoleon proved to be one of history's greatest generals and brought the French one glittering victory after another. Yet France's greatest achievements were not territorial or military, but cultural.
Frenchmen such as Montaigne and Descartes launched modern philosophy. Frenchmen led in science and mathematics. Paris was a center of baroque and classic architecture. Louis XIV, the Sun King, had a lavish court at Versailles and was the model, and envy, of every ruler on the continent. France launched the Enlightenment and the Age of Reason with writings by Voltaire, Diderot, Rousseau and many others. The idea of enlightened despotism made French thinkers popular in royal courts throughout central and eastern Europe. Aristocrats and all educated people spoke French. It was the language of diplomacy; the means of access into cosmopolitan society. Even with its revolution France generated a wealth of advanced ideas and political innovations. France ruled an empire of the heart and mind.
In this context one can see why my proprietor in Chambery would regard himself as a "19th Century man." It was the era when France led the world and the world voluntarily conformed itself to the French model. With three of the last four centuries (and thirteen of the last fifteen) being so glorious for France, no wonder they feel superior.
2. French and English
The trouble began in 1066 when a Frenchman, William Duke of Normandy, conquered England. His French knights and soldiers became the rulers of England. In theory William owed feudal loyalty to the French King Philip. In fact they were competitors. William competed for power against Philip, while Philip sent armies against Normandy and interfered in the English succession after William's death. Problems and conflicts continued chronically thereafter.
In 1137 Eleanor of Aquitaine, who had a vast territory in the southwest of France, married French King Louis VII. The marriage produced only daughters and was annulled. Eleanor then married King Henry II of England. Henry became master of England, Normandy and Aquitaine, much more territory than the French king owned directly. This and other marriages between French and English nobility contributed to extensive English claims on land in France. At one point the Angevin Empire - English holdings in France - amounted to half the country.
Things went from bad to worse and led to "The Hundred Years War" which lasted an awfully long time. Dates vary; 1337-1453 is the traditional estimate but 1328-1515 is reasonable, ending when the English finally quit Calais, their last holding in France. Ultimately the English lost, that is they were driven out of France. But they celebrated some extraordinary victories along the way. In 1346 at Crecy a badly outnumbered English army demolished the French army attacking them. In 1415 at Agincourt a far superior French force was again destroyed by the English.
French nobility was no match for the English army but French nationalism, for example in in the person of Joan or Arc (circa 1428) did the job. The English were unable to conquer a nation that rejected them. Several things are noteworthy. The French developed strong national feeling six centuries ago, but in the rest of Europe the Hapsburgs (for example) were assembling an empire by marriage until much more recently. It's also important that The Hundred Years War was contemporaneous with two natural disasters, the Little Ice Age which saw diminished crop yields, and the Black Death (bubonic plague) which killed something like a quarter or a third of the population. Memories of the long war with England are memories of the most horrible period in France's history.
Conflicts with England continued. As mentioned above, English were major participants in alliances that defeated Louis XIV and Napoleon. The conflicts were not just on the European continent. The British conquered Quebec, effectively ending the French presence in North America. They drove the French out of India, which became "the jewel in the crown" of the British Empire. Admiral Nelson swept the French navy from the seas.
It is not just the chronic military conflicts which cause French animosity toward the English. The English refuse to recognize French cultural superiority. With the limited exception of northern Italy during the Renaissance, France has been the cultural and intellectual leader of continental Europe from the fall of Rome nearly to the 20th Century. The British are unimpressed; they invented the industrial revolution, they developed democracy and an advanced economy even earlier than the French, and the English and Scottish Enlightenment was as brilliant and successful as the French. Not only are they unwilling to acknowledge French superiority, but there is a sound basis for their position. That is truly offensive.
In the first half of the 20th Century one would think of France and Britain as allies, against German aggression. But there were still problems. When France fell to the Nazi blitzkrieg a puppet government was set up in Vichy. The French, including the remnants of the French army, navy and colonial administrations, gave their loyalty (in varying degrees) to Vichy. Things were going badly for the British on every front and it was vital for Britain to retain naval superiority in the Mediterranean Sea. If the French Mediterranean fleet was taken over by the Nazis it could be a disaster.
The British demanded the French surrender or scuttle their Mediterranean fleet to prevent it from falling into German hands. When the French didn't respond quickly enough, on July 3, 1940, the British navy shelled and sank French navy ships in the Algerian port of Mers-el-Kebir, with many French deaths. Mers-el-Kebir is remembered by the French in anniversary ceremonies to this day.
The Allies (Britain, the US and DeGaulle's Free French) decided to begin American troops' involvement in the European war by an invasion of North Africa. Operation Torch planned for American and British troops to land on beaches in Morocco and Algeria. These were areas controlled by French who reported to Vichy. They didn't listen to DeGaulle, and they had no love for the British. They were willing to talk, at least, with the Americans. General Eisenhower was able to minimize French army resistance to the landings on November 8, 1942, but there was some fighting between French and Allied troops.
This French willingness to distinguish between British and Americans didn't last. DeGaulle sat at his headquarters in London constantly feeling offended and slighted. He believed he embodied the nation of France and that he should be an equal partner with the the US and Britain. The fact that he had very few troops, no war material, no economy to produce war material, no money, and very questionable support from his own countrymen evidently did not seem relevant to him. He was offended, not just for himself but for France. At that point he decided that "the Anglo-Saxons" were the historical enemies of France. English speaking people, Americans as well as British, inherited the animosity the French traditionally held for the English.
DeGaulle's innovation endured. After WW 2 the US was in a dominant position in western Europe. French conservatives and nationalists across the political spectrum did not like being a second rank power or having to conform national policy to policies set by others. The fact that the power was English-speaking and culturally close to Britain made the whole situation even more offensive.
Today French conservatives, remembering nine centuries of conflict with the English, have a deep seated distrust and dislike for "Anglo-Saxons." On a personal basis, a British or American person visiting France will be treated courteously and accepted (or not) as an individual. Most French don't let politics dominate interpersonal relations. In fact ordinary people in France don't spend much time thinking about history and international relations. But when the French mind turns to geopolitics, well, they know who the bad guys are.
This dislike of America by the right wing is in contrast to most European nations where the political right can tolerate the US, but the political left cannot. That is not to say we have friends on the left. The political left in France despises and demonizes the US. Early in the last French presidential election the Socialist party was producing vitriolic anti-American speeches as a way of "solidifying the base" i.e. letting supporters know why they should be emotionally committed to the party. However as best I can discern the left is not angry over history. They are exercised over mythology.
The left imagines the US to be some economic jungle where Darwinian notions of survival-of-the-fittest are the governing principle, people are starving in the streets, children are homeless, and "liberal" economics reigns supreme. The reality is ignored; the US government in the aggregate spends about 37% of gdp, mountains of laws and regulations reach into every aspect of life, there are vast (and actuarily bankrupt) government entitlement programs, the US spends about 15% of gdp on health care the majority of which comes from the government, corporations face the second highest tax rates in the developed world, and America's poor generally live as well as France's lower middle class, with high caloric intake, ample living space, cars and all manner of appliances. The US is simply too far away and the reality of US circumstances too little known to prevent partisan generalizations from being widely accepted.
In sum, for one reason or another, to French people across the political spectrum, the US occupies their imagination as an example of just how wrong a society can be. They view the US something like Americans used to think of the Soviet Union or Communist China.
3. French foreign policy
French foreign policy is governed by Richelieu's example and his guiding principle, raison d'etat.
If you look up raison d'etat on Wikipedia it sounds innocuous, it just means national interest. Countries base their foreign policy on their interests, as opposed to ideology or religious principles. Wikipedia says raison d'etat was an idea first developed by Machiavelli and first implemented by Richelieu.
The US rarely explains its policies by referring to the principle of raison d'etat, at least on big issues. When we fought Hitler it was "a crusade in Europe." During the cold war we confronted an "evil empire." Opposition to the Vietnam War was based on the perception that the war was immoral. President Bush tried to get the world to agree to oppose the "axis of evil" and we are in Iraq to bring them the blessings of democracy. National interest is not unheard of in the US; Henry Kissinger valued it, and some conservatives criticized Clinton's war with Serbia as improper because "vital national interests" were not at risk. But in general the US population does not understand or support foreign policy based on raison d'etat.
To the French national interest is the only basis for foreign policy. Oh, they may endorse some general principles like world peace, free trade or whatever but they would not allow such general positions to actually harm or disadvantage their nation.
One might ask, what's wrong with a country pursuing its own interests? It sounds natural enough and ultimately that's what most countries end up doing anyway, whether they realize it or not. It can be taken too far. If national interest is the only thing that matters in foreign relations, distinctions between good and bad cannot be made. The US and the Soviet Union are morally equivalent. Saddam Hussein and the President of the US are morally equivalent. It is naive to consider they might differ. If national interest is the only thing, one does not hesitate to stir up war by diplomatic maneuver and subsidies, as Richelieu did, even though many lives are lost and a countryside is devastated.
Richelieu added two distinctive features to the practice of raison d'etat. One was lying a lot. He deceived the Hapsburgs, which made them that much more vulnerable to his schemes.
A short anecdote; some Americans still think France is our friend. DeGaulle said nations do not have permanent friends, only permanent interests. In this past year I saw a former French ambassador to the US on American television talking about our two countries and how they were friends. The ambassador was very sophisticated, smart and experienced. In private and in consultation with his countrymen he surely did not talk about France and America as friends, yet that was his message to an American audience. Why not talk like that? Civilized people (i.e. people who speak French and have a passing familiarity with French culture) would not be misled.
Richelieu's other distinctive feature was that policies do not have to help your country, just as long as they harm your enemy. Shipping piles of money to Sweden did not help the French treasury but it was a cost-effective way to sap the power of the Hapsburgs. Harm to the opponent, in and of itself, was a benefit to France. Now realize at the time France and the Hapsburgs were not at war, and from their diplomacy they were ostensibly "friends."
What is France's national interest? Like any other country they want power and influence, security and prosperity, but there are some distinctive features of French perception of their national interest that we might not realize.
- defense
The geography of France relates to its perception of national interest. France has been extraordinarily blessed by geography. It has a large amount of arable land, well-watered, fertile, and in a temperate climate. It has a wide variety of interesting terrain, long sea coasts and many navigable rivers which are helpful to trade as well as the fishing industry. What is most beneficial about the geography is that France is safe from almost any military attack. France has never been attacked from the Atlantic or the Mediterranean, and almost never from across the Pyrenees or the Alps. Their difficulties with the English, across the Channel, are of their own creation due to William's conquest and all the intermarriage of English and French nobility.
The only serious military exposure is in the northeast, where the northern European plain runs across the north of France eastward all the way to the Ural Mountains. For most of France's long history the states on its northeast border have been small and disorganized. The only exceptions were when the Hapsburgs controlled the Spanish Netherlands and when Bismarck united Germany. So for most of French history, whenever some horrific barbarian scourge came out of Asia (Avars, Mongols, Ottoman Turks, etc.) they did not reach France. There were rank after rank of European countries between France and such threats, and those other European countries had to fight for their own national survival, defending France in the process.
So the French attitude toward military security is, let someone else take care of the problem. This was the attitude of DeGaulle when he withdrew from NATO's military structure in 1966. NATO forces in Germany were face to face with the Soviet Army and France was to their immediate rear. France was essential for logistic support and defense in depth. DeGaulle just thumbed his nose. In his judgment France was secure and it was the job of those other people to fight and die. The same mentality was present a few years ago when French leaders called for an exclusively European military command, intending to push NATO out of Europe. This policy proposal ignored the security issues faced by EU members in Eastern Europe.
The French mentality may be affected by 6 decades of security provided at no expense (to France) by the US. Generations of French have grown up not having to worry about war or military risk. [The exception being two colonial wars decades ago.] The major foreign policy event in their lives has been formation of the European community, which was accomplished by negotiation, with goodwill on all sides. So French people may have a naivete about security issues, exemplified by my proprietor's trust in Stalin's good intentions, his dismissal of security issues in eastern Europe, and his unwillingness to recognize Hezbollah's creation of a private army and their takeover of southern Lebanon as legitimate concerns for Israel.
Even though France pays no attention to the security issues of its fellow EU members, it does spend more on defense that most any other nation in Europe with the possible exception of Britain. France independently and at great expense developed nuclear weapons. The American general who currently heads NATO's European command says France has a very fine army. They also have a nuclear powered aircraft carrier (costing billions) which enables France to project power around the globe. Since the French homeland is secure, why spend the money? A strong military is the price of admission to the great power club. Prestige and influence are at stake. Also it is simply unacceptable for Great Britain to be stronger than France.
- trade
The structure of the French economy affects the perception of national interest. The economy is run by an elite closely connected with the government, and to explain that I must describe French higher education. A university education is available to everyone, tuition free. That's marvelous for parents and students except for one thing, the quality of this universally available education is abysmal. So France educates its highest potential students, about 1% of the student-age population, in special universities. There are 160 "grandes ecoles" (big schools) graduating a total of about 1100 students per year.
Class size is small and spending per student very high. Grandes ecoles are budgeted and administered separately from the public university system. Admission is extremely competitive so they are sure of admitting the best of the best. As a result the graduates are far more capable than most anyone else. Two thirds of French CEOs and probably more than three fourths of top bureaucrats are alumni of grands ecoles. They have a very strong "old boys" network.
Even among grandes ecoles some are more elite than others. A couple of school names reappear frequently among very senior government and business leaders, Sciences Po and Ecole Polytechnique. In addition there is a graduate school for these super high potential students once they get their first diploma, the National School for Administration (ENA). It's graduates are called "enarques" and the high proportion of cabinet ministers and candidates for the Presidency who are enarques is tantamount to a scandal.
These graduates know each other. Any really important job in France, whether in government or business, is likely to go to an alumnus of a grande ecole. People move between government and business easily and often. The current Finance Minister, Thierry Breton, a man in his 40s, was CEO of a corporation and probably will be again when he leaves government. In the US people from the private sector serve in government, but most often it is professionals (lawyers, economists, academics) or executives nearing retirement, not mid-career managers. Government control over business is facilitated by extensive government shareholding in supposedly private-sector enterprises.
All this has several notable effects on the structure of the economy. Government and big business work closely together. France is good at undertaking really major economic endeavors. For example most electricity in France is produced by nuclear power plants. This required very long term planning, massive investment, extensive coordination with government agencies, great technical expertise, and superb management and leadership. In the US nuclear power has been marked by false starts and many roadblocks. Under the French system, no problem.
The flip side is, France generally does not do small economic endeavors well. Small proprietors can't get capital. They don't have connections to facilitate their efforts. Their credentials do not inspire confidence. Government is indifferent to their issues. Except for the really big projects the French economy lacks dynamism.
France looks to big projects and the government to keep the economy moving. Very high level people in France, who make the key decisions, are comfortable dealing with very high level people in other countries. Since much of the world is governed by dictators, the French are comfortable dealing with dictators. They did billions of dollars of business with Saddam Hussein. Given the close connection between government and business, the French foreign ministry did its part protecting that trade relationship.
Generally the US and Britain are trading nations. Napoleon called England a nation of shopkeepers. We perceive global trade, free trade, freedom of the seas, democracy and peace generally as in our national interest because ordinary business people, large and small, can pursue their activities without interference and increase prosperity for all. France doesn't see it that way. Trade should be managed, capital flows should be controlled, and generally government should stay on top of things. In such an environment the French elite, which straddles government and industry, has an advantage.
The giant projects at which France excels don't always go well. Airbus Industries has faced problems. Four decades ago some extremely smart members of the elite surveyed the world economy and noted there was only one major supplier of commercial aircraft (Boeing). Surely the world economy had room for two. Airbus Industries was born.
The super-organization that is France moved forward. Diplomats drew in other European nations as partners for this extremely expensive endeavor. Scientists and engineers, bankers and finance ministers, and scores of experts were mobilized. A new global industrial enterprise emerged. Unfortunately the first big project was the supersonic Concorde which was not a commercial success, and consumed a fortune in taxpayer funds. Airbus then had success with regular transport planes and in the 90s became a serious competitor to Boeing. Most recently Airbus has made a major bet on jumbo passenger carriers that can carry up to 600 people. It looks like this will be a commercial failure and vast funds from national treasuries will be needed to keep the company afloat.
Two points about Airbus: First, jobs in Europe and national prestige are more important than turning a profit. That is harmful to the whole economy over time, as the money-losing enterprise consumes public funds. Second, these vast subsidies are in violation of trade treaties France has signed. France cannot save Airbus and at the same time live up to its treaty commitments, but it cannot allow Airbus to fail. The political ramifications are too severe. French national interest will almost always trump a commitment to free trade.
- culture
Americans think about power in terms of military strength, influence on foreign governments, money and trade. If we travel in a foreign country and see a McDonald's restaurant we think of it simply as a fast food restaurant. If we walk past a movie theater in a French town and see several of the films offered are from Hollywood, we don't give it a second thought. French, at least the French who care about political issues, see a McDonalds or a Hollywood film and see cultural imperialism. To them culture is one of the most important ways in which nations exercise influence around the world.
To defend French culture the government takes official action to keep English words out of the French language. They subsidize French cinema and other cultural activities, and limit the amount of US-originated programs that can be shown on television. To promote French culture around the world, France leads La Francophonie, an organization of governments with a shared interest in French language and culture, and they sponsor the Alliance Francaise, a kind of club in just about every major city in the developed world, to promote French language and culture. Their well-staffed embassies around the world have strong programs to disseminate information about French culture.
In those centuries when France was the leading nation of the the world, their influence was first and foremost in the area of ideas, arts and language. France still clings to that, both in the sense of their hoped-for role in the world and in the sense of how they perceive the actions of other nations. In this context we can understand the statement of former French President Mitterrand, "... we are at war with America. Yes, a permanent war, a vital war, an economic war, a war without death. Yes, they are very hard, the Americans, they are voracious, they want undivided power over the world."
Everyone is entitled to their opinion. The point, I think, is that the French political elite is unlikely to perceive the US as a friend, and most French regard the country as being in a cultural battle with the US.
- 2003 and today
2003 was a kind of high point for France expressing itself on the world stage, but it appears they overplayed their hand and now must adopt more modest tactics in pursuing their interests.
The key players were President Chirac and his foreign minister Villepin, now prime minister. Up to that time the French left had repeatedly demonstrated they hated America, but they did little about it other than making nasty speeches. Conservatives like Villepin and Chirac saw the US and its British ally much like Richelieu viewed the Hapsburgs, as France's primary competitors in a brutal, winner-take-all national competition. They wanted to win.
Coming up to 2003 things were going well. The European Union was expanding in wealth and power, as well as in the number of member countries, and France was the leader. Generally Germany and France worked together to lead Europe, but France was clearly the senior partner. The often expressed French dream of building up Europe as a counterweight to US power was coming true. An EU of 25 nations would have an economy equal to the US, with a population half again as large. Historically eastern European countries had a high regard for France and were inclined to follow its example. It was likely they would accept the existing French-German leadership. France would soon be at the lead of a powerful political entity, unsurpassed on the globe.
What was needed next was a Richelieu-type stroke of boldness and genius, to cripple and humble the US opponent. Opportunity knocked in the form of inept foreign policy by the Bush administration.
George W. Bush had the misfortune to face the greatest test of his presidency in an area where he had no experience and little aptitude, foreign policy. Two mistakes he made leading up to 2003 are relevant here. One was the failure to adjust after his Axis of Evil speech. Bush wanted to use America's great power for good, to control the worst of the rouge states. It turned out most countries were more worried about a powerful America than they were about rogue states, and reaction to the speech was negative. Bush should have adjusted to that, but did not. He set his sights on bringing Saddam Hussein to heel.
The second mistake had to do with timing and the sequence of events. Military build-ups take time, and waging war in the Middle East is seasonal. Some months the weather is so bad you don't want to be campaigning in Iraq. So any military action against Hussein involved long lead times and a sensitive schedule. Bush commenced building up his forces in the middle east well before he obtained diplomatic support for his tough stand against Hussein. That made the US vulnerable, not to a military attack, but to diplomatic delays which could leave our very expensive expeditionary force dangling in uncertainty.
Villepin was just the man for a stroke of boldness and genius. He saw Bush's mistakes and launched his diplomatic attack on the US in the United Nations, where Bush was hoping to obtain an endorsement for his tough stance. Villepin pushed for UN inspections in Iraq, which were farcical but could delay any decision indefinitely, thus maximizing American discomfort over their troop build-up. Villepin was also able to get a majority of other nations to vote against US military action.
He placed the US in a terrible lose-lose position. If they did invade Iraq the US would be condemned as an aggressor and the cost to the US, in diplomatic terms and in every other way, would be astronomical. If the US did not invade Saddam Hussein would be a big winner. Hussein was playing games with the inspections and thumbing his nose at the UN. If the US did nothing he would be clearly perceived as the victor, his prestige would soar, his weapons programs would be vigorously pursued, and in a few years he would dominate the region.
Two other interesting things happened in 2003. In Zimbabwe a dictator and murderer was busy destroying the country, Robert Mugabe. The EU had forbidden Mugabe from setting foot in Europe because of his crimes. Britain was working very hard at diplomacy, particularly within its commonwealth associations, to apply pressure on Mugabe to respect the rights of his citizens. Mugabe was isolated and feeling the pressure. Then in February, 2003 Chirac hosted Mugabe at the Presidential Palace in Paris, complete with press photo opportunities. British diplomacy was submarined. Zimbabwe went from bad to worse, with starvation and economic collapse. Chirac has utterly ignored Zimbabwe since then, but he sure showed those Brits.
When the US was confronting Hussein in 2003 several eastern European countries supported America. They could see in Hussein some of the same characteristics they experienced under Soviet domination. In effect the east Europeans had forgotten their role - so clearly understood by the French - that they were to follow France and add to France's diplomatic weight. Chirac set them straight, telling them to "shut up." Chirac forgot that these were sovereign nations, and that a decision to accept French leadership had to be voluntary.
Villepin's boldness and genius did pay off; the US paid a terrible price. The US invaded and the cost, measured in many ways, has been astronomical. But Villepin fell short of the Richelieu ideal in two respects. First, when Richelieu stabbed the Hapsburgs in the back, he was sneaky enough that they didn't realize it. Villepin was obvious. The US may not have understood the 17th Century resonances, but we knew we had been stabbed in the back. Second, unlike the 17th Century, France is not the beneficiary of US weakness and failure. The first beneficiary is radical Islam and Russia, which has excellent relations with the states that support terrorism. Perhaps even greater beneficiaries are China and India who, with their vast populations and rapid economic growth, look like the next superpowers.
By the end of 2003 Chirac was perceived as petty and indifferent to human suffering, eastern Europe was far less likely to accept French leadership, and Americans perceived France as untrustworthy and an enemy, actively working to harm the US. Since 2003 the French have avoided any new attacks on the US (at least any we could see), the photo ops with dictators have been minimized, and they've even been favorable toward NATO, sending a small (but well publicized) force to Afghanistan.
Today, in spite of Chirac's and Villepin's desire to be major players on the world stage, French foreign policy is dominated by domestic concerns, especially jobs and the economic future. Rather than bold initiatives, France is likely to take a defensive posture, resisting further EU integration and further reduction of global trade barriers.
Posted by rob at September 7, 2006 12:40 PM
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Posted by: Anonymous at September 7, 2006 12:40 PM